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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor John Langbein and I have just concluded a twenty-year
project for the American Law Institute to restate the law of donative
transfers.  The official title of our three-volume Restatement is the Re-
statement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.1  We
refer to it herein simply as the Property Restatement.  The third and
final volume of the work was published in the last days of 2011.  Profes-
sor Langbein spoke about certain of the initiatives in the two earlier
volumes, which set forth the principles governing the law of wills, intes-
tacy, interpretation of instruments, and the nonprobate system.  The
concluding volume covers class gifts, powers of appointment, future in-
terests, and perpetuities.  In our division of labor today, I will be speak-
ing about that material.  Because I will not be able to cover all of the
topics in the third volume, I have added an Appendix to the print ver-
sion that reproduces the Table of Contents for that volume.
Although the Property Restatement does not address the tax-plan-
ning side of the work of estate planners, it does address the state-law
side of the practice: the everyday work of drafting and construing dis-
positive provisions in wills, trusts, and other types of donative docu-
ments, as well as preparing to argue cases at both trial and appellate
levels.  When it comes to litigation, the courts pay attention to the Re-
statement and usually follow it.2
1 1-3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
(2012) [hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT].
2 Following are instances of judicial reliance on parts of the new Property Restate-
ment previously released.  These are cases in which the court changed existing law or
made new law on the basis of the Restatement.  Countless other cases could be cited in
which the court cited the Restatement in support of existing law.
“In sum, we agree with [the Restatement].” Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166, 177 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 916 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007) (adopting the Restatement
position that mere survival language does not trump an antilapse statute).
“We adopt the Restatement view on this subject.” Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Dono-
ghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1200 (Ind. 2008) (adopting, in a tax refor-
mation case, the new Restatement’s position that a mistake of law as well as of fact can
be the basis for reforming a provision in a testamentary trust).
“We agree with [the Restatement] and [other] authorities that the latent/patent distinc-
tion . . . no longer serves any useful purpose.” Univ. of S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843
N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind. 2006) (abandoning the distinction between types of ambiguity in
construing instruments).
“We adopt the view of the American Law Institute on this issue.” Sieh v. Sieh, 713
N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2006) (adopting the new Restatement’s position that a revocable
trust created before the marriage is subject to the forced share of the surviving spouse,
even when the forced share statute refers only to the probate estate).
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The Property Restatement, not the Trusts Restatement, deals with
the interpretative matters applicable to dispositive provisions in trusts as
well as in wills and will substitutes.  Consequently, in construing the
meaning of a dispositive provision in a trust, the relevant Restatement is
the Restatement of Property, not the Restatement of Trusts.
II. RECURRING AMBIGUITIES AND HOW THE RESTATEMENT
RESOLVES THEM
In the case law, a fairly discrete group of ambiguities tend to recur.
The second volume of the Property Restatement contains general rules
dealing with how ambiguities are resolved by techniques of construc-
tion, rules of construction, and constructional preferences.3  My focus in
this portion of the Lecture is on specific instances of ambiguity and how
the rules in the third volume resolve them.
A. Is It a Class Gift or Not?4
Does a disposition “to my children” in a will or trust create a class
gift?  What about a disposition “to my three children, A, B, and C”?5
And, what difference does it make?  The short answers are that the dis-
position “to my children” presumptively creates a class gift, the disposi-
tion “to my three children, A, B, and C” presumptively does not create
a class gift, and it makes a lot of difference whether it is a class gift or
not.
The presumption that a disposition “to my children” creates a class
is rarely rebutted.  Assuming that the presumption is not rebutted, and
that the disposition is classified as a class gift, the identities and shares of
“We follow the Restatement . . . on this point, for the reasons explained.” In re Estate of
Beauregard, 921 N.E.2d 954, 958 n.5 (Mass. 2010) (adopting the new Restatement’s posi-
tion that preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, is the proper
standard of proof for rebutting the presumption that a lost will that is traced to the testa-
tor’s possession was revoked by act).
“The rationale of the Restatement . . . should be applied here.” In re Martin B., 841
N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (terms “issue” and “descendants” in trusts included children
conceived posthumously by means of in vitro fertilization with cryopreserved semen of
grantor’s son).
“[I]t seems logical to this court to choose the path . . . recommended by the Restatement
. . . .” In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sur. Ct. 2002) (adopting the new Restate-
ment’s position that a will can be reformed on the ground of mistake).
3 See 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 10.1 – 11.3.
4 For a more complete discussion of this question, see Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of Property (Univ. Mich. Public Law, Working
Paper No. 266, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006627.
5 In the same category are dispositions “to my children, A, B, and C” and “to my
three children.”
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the beneficiaries are not static, but are subject to fluctuation until the
time when a class member is entitled to distribution; and upon distribu-
tion, the property is divided among the then-entitled class members on a
fractional basis.  Thus, if the transferor has another child, D, that child
becomes a beneficiary (a class member): A, B, C, and D take a one-
fourth share.
Assuming that the presumption that a disposition “to my three chil-
dren, A, B, and C” does not create a class prevails, the identities and
shares of the beneficiaries are fixed.  Thus, if the transferor has another
child, D, that child does not become a beneficiary: A, B, and C take a
one-third share.6  How strong is the presumption?  Because of the in-
flexibility of a gift to individuals whose shares and identities are fixed, as
compared with the flexibility of a class gift, the Property Restatement
makes it clear that presumption against class-gift classification is not
strong.7  For estate planners, the drafting lesson is clear: If a transferor
really does want the shares and identities of the beneficiaries to be fixed,
the disposition should be drafted so that it states that intent clearly and
directly: “one-third to my daughter A, one-third to my son B, and one-
third to my daughter C.”  Drafting “to my three children, A, B, and C”
is never a good idea.
B. Future Interests; Conditions of Survival
At common law, and under the Property Restatement,8 conditions
of survival are not implied.  The law-school classic is “to A for life, re-
mainder to B” or “to A for life, remainder to A’s children.”  If B prede-
ceases A in the first case or if one, some, or all of A’s children
predecease A in the second case, a share passes through the estate of
any predeceased beneficiary.
Standard planning goes the other way: Impose a condition of sur-
vival by making it explicit in the document.  The problem is that expres-
sing a condition of survival can be tricky.  Let’s start with two
dispositions:
“To A for life, remainder to A’s surviving children.”
“To A for life, remainder to A’s children who survive A.”9
6 If the disposition was in a will, D might be awarded a share of the property under
an applicable omitted-child statute. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (2010).
7 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13.2 cmt. d.
8 Id. § 26.3.  For the Restatement’s rationale, see id. § 26.6 cmts. c-e. See id. § 15.3
(an exception to the rule that a condition of survival is not implied arises in the case of a
future interest to a multiple-generation class, i.e. “to A for life, remainder to A’s de-
scendants”). See id. § 26.6 (same for an age specification, i.e. “to A for life, remainder to
A’s children at age 21.”).
9 It is not a good idea to say “remainder to A’s children if they survive A,” unless
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The second version is unambiguous.  The first is quite ambiguous.
There is case law that construes that requirement of survival as referring
to surviving the testator or settlor, not A’s death.10  The Restatement
(First) of Property, supported by other case law,11 provided that the
beneficiaries must survive the time of possession or enjoyment, i.e., A’s
death.12  The new Property Restatement follows that position,13 because
that construction is the more natural meaning of the dispositive lan-
guage and hence represents the probable intent of the transferor.14
Nevertheless, it is far better to avoid the problem: “to A’s children who
survive A.”
Another recurring ambiguity occurs in what I call the “or” cases:
“to A for life, remainder to B or B’s children.”15  The Property Restate-
ment comes down squarely on the side of requiring survival of the in-
come beneficiary.  The rationale is that that construction gives effect to
the natural meaning of the language and probably expresses the trans-
feror’s actual intent.  Nevertheless, using “or” language to express that
intent is hardly recommended, because it raises an ambiguity that must
be resolved by a rule of construction.  That’s always a bad idea.  Lan-
guage that easily avoids the ambiguity takes the following form: “to A
for life, remainder to B if B survives A; if not, to B’s children who sur-
vive A.”
What if the transferor wants the property to go to the descendants
of any beneficiary who predeceases the income beneficiary’s death?
Unfortunately, that intention is sometimes expressed ambiguously.  The
case law shows that scriveners are too often tempted to express the con-
dition of survival on the primary beneficiary in condition-subsequent
your client really means that all of A’s children must survive A in order for any of them
to take.
10 For a case construing ambiguous words of survival as relating to the testator’s
death rather than to the income beneficiary’s death, see In re Nass’s Estate, 182 A. 401,
403 (Pa. 1936) (the rationale was that this construction avoided an inequality among the
testator’s descending lines).
11 Cases construing ambiguous words of survival as relating to the distribution date
(the death of the life tenant) include Ford v. Jones, 3 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Ky. 1927) (not
resulting in an inequality among the descending lines, because court construed remainder
to “my surviving children, if any, or their natural heirs” as creating a substitute gift to the
heirs (apparently construed as meaning issue) of any child who predeceases the distribu-
tion date); See also In re Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (N.Y. 1989)
(resulting in an inequality among the descending lines).
12 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 251 (1940).
13 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 26.4 (“Unless the language or cir-
cumstances establish that the transferor had a different intention, an express condition of
survival that is ambiguous regarding the time to which survival is required is construed to
require the beneficiary or beneficiaries to survive the distribution date.”).
14 Id. § 26.4 cmt. b.
15 Id. § 26.5.
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form.  Conditions expressed in condition-subsequent form can be am-
biguous and can lead to unintended results.16  Any condition can be ex-
pressed in precedent or subsequent form.17  Here is an example of
imprecision produced by the condition-subsequent form: “to A for life,
remainder to B, but if B fails to survive A, to B’s descendants who sur-
vive A.”  If B survives A, B takes.  If B predeceases A and leaves de-
scendants who survive A, B’s descendants take.  If both B and B’s
descendants predecease A, however, the right to the property passes
through B’s estate to B’s successors in interest.  Yet, the transferor (and
the scrivener) might not have anticipated that the right to trust principal
would pass through B’s estate if B predeceases A without leaving de-
scendants who survive A.  The condition-subsequent form produces
much litigation, whereas the precedent form tends to avoid ambiguity,
and hence avoids the need to litigate the meaning of the disposition.
The precedent form pressures the scrivener to identify with more care
the various events that might transpire in the future, especially those
that are improbable but not impossible.  In turn, the precedent form
allows the scrivener to bring each eventuality to the transferor’s atten-
tion and to implement the transferor’s intention regarding each poten-
tial event in unambiguous language.18  Assuming that the transferor
would not have wanted the property to pass through B’s estate no mat-
ter what happened, the precedent form would be: “to A for life, remain-
der to B if B survives A; if B fails to survive A, to B’s descendants who
survive A.”19
III. SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW: SIMPLIFIED CLASSIFICATION OF
PRESENT AND FUTURE INTERESTS
One of the goals of Restatements in general is to simplify the law
when possible.  The Property Restatement does that.  One of the long-
outdated areas in need of simplification is the complicated system of
classification of present and future interests, a system that was devel-
oped over the centuries in English land law to serve a variety of feudal
purposes.
16 Id. § 26.2 cmt. e.
17 A condition precedent provides that the beneficiary is entitled to take in posses-
sion or enjoyment “if” a specified event happens, as in “to A for life, then to B if B
survives A; if not, to C.”  A condition subsequent provides that the beneficiary is entitled
to take in possession or enjoyment, “but not if” a specified event happens, as in “to A for
life, then to B, but if B fails to survive A, to C.” Id. § 25.3 cmt. b.
18 See id. § 26.5 cmt. c (discussing the perils of using the condition-subsequent
form).
19 This form also forces a decision regarding who should take if B predeceases A
without leaving descendants who survive A.
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English land law divided present estates into two broad catego-
ries—freehold and nonfreehold.  The freehold estates were the fee sim-
ple absolute, the fee simple determinable, the fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent, the fee simple subject to an executory limitation,
and the life estate.  The nonfreehold estate relevant to donative trans-
fers was the term of years.
English land law divided future interests into two broad catego-
ries—reversionary and nonreversionary.  The reversionary future inter-
ests were the reversion, the possibility of reverter, and the right of entry.
The nonreversionary future interests were the remainder and the execu-
tory interest.  Future interests were also classified in terms of vesting.
The categories were indefeasibly vested, vested subject to defeasance,
and contingent.  The distinction between a future interest that was
vested subject to defeasance and one that was contingent rested on the
mere verbal difference between a condition that was stated in the form
of a condition precedent (remainder to B if B survives the life tenant)
and a condition subsequent (remainder to B, but not if B predeceases
the life tenant).
Today, present and future interests are predominantly created as
equitable interests in trust, not as legal interests in land.  For modern
purposes, the system of classification based on English land law is un-
necessarily complex.  As noted in a prominent treatise on the English
law of real property, “English real property law has tended to have an
unenviable reputation for its complexity.”20  The complexity serves no
purpose in modern circumstances, and England simplified its land law
by legislation in 1925.21  When, in the 1930s, the Restatement (First) of
Property embraced the complex system of English land law, the Presi-
dent of the American Law Institute, George W. Wickersham, said that
one of its accomplishments was “to state what is a recognized principle
of law in such clear and distinct form that its bad nature may become
apparent.”22
Recognizing that the principal function of classification today is de-
scriptive, the Property Restatement simplifies the doctrine of estates for
20 CHARLES HARPUM ET AL., MEGARRY & WADE: THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1-001 (7th ed. 2008).
21 Id. §§ 1-016 to -017.
22 11 ALI PROCEEDINGS 146 (1932-1934).  The first Restatement was heavily criti-
cized for perpetuating the old categories. See Myres S. McDougal, Future Interests Re-
stated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1942).  A
comprehensive proposal for simplifying the system was first advanced in Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 85
HARV. L. REV. 729 (1972).
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American law.23  Under the Property Restatement, the distinction be-
tween freehold and nonfreehold estates is no longer recognized.  The
present interests are the fee simple absolute, the fee simple defeasible,
the life estate, and the term of years.  The future interests are the rever-
sion and the remainder.  In terms of vesting, a future interest is either
vested or contingent.  The following table lists the categories of present
and future interests recognized in the Restatement:
Present Interest Future Interest
Fee simple absolute (land) None
Absolute ownership (personal property) None
Reversion (Contingent or Vested)Fee simple defeasible Remainder (Contingent or Vested)
Reversion (Contingent or Vested)Life estate Remainder (Contingent or Vested)
Reversion (Contingent or Vested)Term of years Remainder (Contingent or Vested)
The Restatement’s definitions of present interests are mostly un-
remarkable.  The definitions of the fee simple absolute (land) or abso-
lute ownership (personal property), the life estate, and the term of years
are quite conventional.  Unremarkable also are the Property Restate-
ment’s acknowledgment that the fee tail estate, the Rule in Shelley’s
Case, and the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders are not
recognized in American law.24
The principal innovation on the present interest side is that the
Property Restatement absorbs under one title—the fee simple defeasi-
ble—the estates currently classified as a fee simple determinable, a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent, or a fee simple subject to an
executory limitation.  On the future interests side, the Property Restate-
ment absorbs under one title—the remainder—the future interests cur-
rently classified as a remainder or an executory interest, and absorbs
under one title—the reversion—the future interests currently classified
as a reversion, a possibility of reverter, or a right of entry.  Also on the
future interests side, the Property Restatement redefines the terms
vested and contingent.  A future interest that is currently classified as
indefeasibly vested is classified as vested.  A future interest that is cur-
23 For a more complete discussion of the Property Restatement’s simplification of
the doctrine of estates, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Pro-
poses Simplifying the Doctrine of Estates (Univ. Mich. Public Law, Working Paper No.
198, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612878.
24 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 16.2, 24.4, 25.5.
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rently classified as vested subject to defeasance or as contingent is classi-
fied as contingent.
Once upon a time, classification was important, because it produced
legal consequences, but now far less so and under the Property Restate-
ment no longer.  Formerly, a contingent remainder could be destroyed
under the destructibility rule but an executory interest was not subject
to that rule; a legal remainder to the life tenant’s heirs was subject to the
Rule in Shelley’s Case but an executory interest was not subject to that
rule.  Because the destructibility rule and the Rule in Shelley’s Case are
no longer part of American law, the distinction has lost its significance.
At one time, the distinction between a contingent remainder and a
vested remainder or a vested reversion subject to divestment had sev-
eral legal consequences: alienability, acceleration, and perpetuities.  A
contingent remainder was inalienable, could not accelerate when the
holder of the preceding estate disclaimed, and was subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities, whereas a vested remainder and a vested reversion
subject to divestment were alienable, would accelerate, and were ex-
empt from the Rule Against Perpetuities.  Under the Restatement, how-
ever, all future interests are alienable, and under widespread disclaimer
legislation, all future interests accelerate.  As for perpetuities, the Re-
statement shifts from a time-of-vesting to a time-of-termination rule.
Under the Restatement’s time-of-termination rule, whether a future in-
terest is vested or contingent is irrelevant.  As explained later, the Re-
statement’s perpetuity rule provides that any trust or other donative
disposition that does not terminate on or before the expiration of the
perpetuity period is subject to being judicially modified in a manner that
forces the trust or other disposition to terminate within the perpetuity
period.25
If, under the Property Restatement, classification no longer pro-
duces legal consequences, why does classification matter?  What is its
remaining significance?  Under the Restatement, classification is merely
descriptive—a short-hand way of labeling an interest that has specific
characteristics.  The time has come to unclutter the system and put a
stop to the antiquated preference for form over substance, and that is
what the Restatement seeks to do.
A. Remainders and Reversions
Under the Property Restatement, a future interest is either a re-
mainder or a reversion.26  Gone are executory interests, possibilities of
reverter, and rights of entry.  What is now labeled an executory interest
25 See infra Part VI.
26 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 25.2.
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becomes a remainder.  What is now labeled a possibility of reverter or a
right of entry becomes a reversion.  The distinction between a remain-
der and a reversion is that a reversion is a future interest that was re-
tained by the transferor and a remainder is a future interest that was
created in a transferee.
Why continue to distinguish between a remainder and a reversion?
Why not just label all future interests under one title?  There are a
couple of reasons.  One is that the distinction can be important for vari-
ous tax-law purposes.27  Another is that the distinction is recognized in
various uniform laws28 and other Restatements29 and accords with the
usage of the profession.
B. Vested Versus Contingent
The Property Restatement provides that a future interest is either
vested or contingent.30  A future interest, whether a remainder or a re-
version, is vested if it is certain to take effect in possession or enjoyment.
A future interest is contingent if it might not take effect in possession or
enjoyment.  Gone is the artificial distinction between a condition prece-
dent and a condition subsequent.  Under the Restatement, a disposition
“to A for life, then to B if B survives A, and if not, to C” and one “to A
for life, then to B, but if B fails to survive A, to C” are treated the same.
In both cases, B and C have a contingent remainder.  Under the current
but out-of-date system of classification, B and C would have contingent
remainders in the first case, but B would have a vested remainder sub-
ject to divestment and C would have an executory interest in the second
case.
27 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 673 (trust in which the grantor has a “reversionary interest” in
either the corpus or the income); I.R.C. § 2037 (inter vivos transfer in which the decedent
has retained a “reversionary interest”); I.R.C. § 2042 (life insurance in which the insured
possessed at his death a “reversionary interest,” a term that includes a possibility that the
policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be
subject to a power of disposition by him); I.R.C. § 2702 (“retained interest” and “noncon-
tingent remainder interest”); I.R.C. § 6163(a) (granting an extension of time for the pay-
ment of the estate tax on the value of a “reversionary or remainder interest in property”
that is taxable in the decedent’s estate); I.R.C. § 7520 (any “remainder or reversionary
interest”). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(f)(2) ( “[A] remainder interest includes a
reversion”).
28 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE (2005); UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT (2000).
29 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 7 (2003) (referring to a resulting
trust as a “reversionary, equitable interest”).  Both the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011)
variously refer to property as “reverting” or “reverting back” to the transferor or the
transferor’s estate or successors in interest in certain cases.
30 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 25.3.
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C. Postponed Class Gifts
If a future interest is in favor of a class, the Property Restatement
labels it as a “postponed class gift.”  In the case of a postponed class gift
that is open to new entrants, the Restatement classifies the future inter-
est of each existing class member as a remainder that is subject to
open.31  Under the Restatement, a remainder that is subject to open can
be either vested or contingent, depending on whether it is certain to
take effect in possession or enjoyment; and the future interest of a po-
tential class member is always classified as a contingent remainder.
IV. ADDRESSING NEW ISSUES: CLASS-GIFT RIGHTS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
A goal of Restatements is to address new issues.  The issue that
stands out here is the class-gift rights of children of assisted reproduc-
tion.32  Class-gift rights of children of assisted reproduction pose rela-
tively new and complex questions in the law, questions that are destined
to become increasingly important as the use of assisted reproduction
technologies increases.  So far, there has been relatively little legislation
on the subject.  In the absence of legislation, the Property Restatement
is likely to be cited and could influence the case law, as it already has in
at least one case.33
The Restatement is quite comprehensive, covering different paren-
tal relationships, sperm sources, egg sources, and birth mothers:
Parental Sperm Source Egg Source Birth MotherRelationship
The husband or The wife or a 3d The wife or aHusband & wife a 3d party donor party donor surrogate
Unmarried The male partner The female The female
opposite sex or a 3d party partner or a 3d partner or a
partners donor party donor surrogate
Unmarried female
partners or One of the female One of the femalemarried female 3d party donor partners or a 3d partners or apartners in a state party donor surrogaterecognizing same-
sex marriages
31 Id. § 25.4.
32 For a more complete discussion of the class-gift rights of children of assisted re-
production, see Waggoner, supra note 4, at 11-19, 21-22.
33 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (Sur. Ct. 2007).
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Parental Sperm Source Egg Source Birth MotherRelationship
The unpartnered The unpartneredUnpartnered 3d party donor female or a 3d female or afemale party donor surrogate
Unmarried male
partners or One of the malemarried male partners or a 3d 3d party donor Surrogatepartners in a state party donorrecognizing same-
sex marriages
The unpartnered
Unpartnered male male or a 3d 3d party donor Surrogate
party donor
The Restatement has two sections dealing with children of assisted
reproduction, one covering the case in which the birth mother is not
acting as a surrogate34 and the other covering the case in which the birth
mother is acting as a surrogate.35
A. Non-surrogate Birth Mother
If the birth mother is not acting as a surrogate, the Restatement’s
position is that a child of assisted reproduction is presumptively treated
for class-gift purposes as the birth mother’s child.36  Because the birth
mother is a woman who voluntarily became pregnant by means of as-
sisted reproduction, the Property Restatement presumes that her pur-
pose was to have her child.  Regardless of whether she is the child’s
genetic mother (i.e., whether or not the egg that was fertilized was her
egg or the egg of a third-party donor), her action in undergoing the pro-
cedure presumptively establishes a parent-child relationship between
her and the child.37  It does not matter whether she is married,
partnered with another in a domestic partnership,38 or unpartnered.
Consequently, if the birth mother or someone else creates a will, trust,
or other arrangement that contains a class gift in favor of the birth
34 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8.
35 See id. § 14.9.
36 The position set forth in the Restatement is consistent with the Uniform Probate
Code and the Uniform Parentage Act. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-705(b), 2-120(c)
(2010); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (2002).
37 This position is consistent with the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Par-
entage Act. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(c); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a).
38 The Restatement uses the term “domestic partner” in the sense that it is defined
in the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03
(2000).
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mother’s “children” or “descendants,” the child is presumptively a class
member.
The harder question in the non-surrogacy cases is whether the child
has another parent.39  It is important to keep in mind that the question
is not whether the birth mother wants to have another person’s child but
whether that other person wants the child be treated as his or her child.
Thus, under the Restatement, the birth mother’s child is also a child of
another person if that other person consented to assisted reproduction
by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the child’s other par-
ent.40  As depicted in the above table, a birth mother who is not acting
as a surrogate is a female who is either married to a male, unmarried but
partnered with a male, unmarried but partnered with a female or mar-
ried to a female in a state recognizing same-sex marriages, or an un-
partnered female.  If the birth mother is married or partnered with a
male or female, and if no divorce, separation, or similar proceedings are
pending, the Restatement establishes a presumption that her married
spouse or her partner did consent to assisted reproduction with intent to
be treated as the child’s other parent.41  If the birth mother is unmarried
and unpartnered, the child is not the child of a “third-party sperm
donor.”42
39 Under the Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code, a third-party donor
never has such a relationship. See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8 cmt.
n; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(b) (2010).
40 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8(2) cmts. e-g, k.
41 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8 cmt. h.
42 See id. § 14.8 cmt. j.  For the definition of a “third-party sperm donor,” see id.
§ 14.8 Reporter’s Note 3 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(a)(3) (2010)).  If the
unmarried and unpartnered birth mother subsequently marries or enters into an unmar-
ried partnership with another, the presumption that her married spouse or her partner
consented to assisted reproduction with intent to be treated as the child’s other parent
child does not apply. 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8 cmt. j.  A subse-
quent spouse or partner functions more as a stepparent of the child, not as a parent of the
child. Id. Under § 14.5, however, the child would be treated as the adopted child of the
new spouse or partner if that spouse or partner adopts the child.
A third-party sperm donor does not include “an individual who has been determined
. . . to have a parent-child relationship with a child of assisted reproduction.” Id. § 14.8
Reporter’s Note 3 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(a)(3)(C)).  Thus, if the sperm
donor was a friend or acquaintance of the birth mother, as distinguished from a sperm
donor who anonymously deposited sperm in a sperm bank, he could be treated for class-
gift purposes as the other parent of the child (i.e., he would not be classified as a third-
party donor), but only if the evidence establishes that he consented to assisted reproduc-
tion by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the child’s other parent.  If the sperm
donor who was a friend or acquaintance subsequently married the birth mother or be-
came her domestic partner, his consent would still have to be established by proof; the
presumption that he consented would not apply.
36 ACTEC LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:23
Much of the discussion in the literature has focused on posthumous
conception.  Although that is an important question, it is only one part
of the overall picture.  A typical case is that of a married couple who are
having difficulty producing a pregnancy.  Adoption is always a possibil-
ity, but they may first try one or more of the range of solutions offered
by fertility clinics, including artificial insemination or in vitro fertiliza-
tion.  If the husband’s sperm is used for either procedure, and if the
wife’s eggs are used for in vitro fertilization, there is no problem—the
child is the genetic child of both parents.  If the sperm of someone other
than the husband is used, or the eggs of someone other than the wife are
used for in vitro fertilization, the child is not the genetic child of both
parents.  If the procedure proves successful, and the wife carries the
child to birth, and if the married couple do what is expected and func-
tion as parents of the child, the child will be presumptively treated as
their child for class-gift purposes.
B. Posthumous Conception43
Regarding posthumous conception, a case that comes readily to
mind is that of a member of our armed forces who is deployed to a war
zone.  He is recently married, perhaps has a young baby or his wife is
pregnant with their first child.  Before departing for the war zone, he
leaves sperm in a sperm bank for use by his widow in case he does not
make it back alive.  Tragically, he is killed in action.  After a reasonable
period of grieving, his widow decides to use the frozen sperm to get
pregnant and bear his child.  Suppose that the soldier’s mother had died
several years earlier, creating a trust that paid the income to him for life,
remainder in principal to his “children” (or “issue”).  Is the posthumous
child to be treated as a member of the class or not?  Under the Restate-
ment’s position, the child would presumptively be treated as a member
43 Technically, and unfortunately, a posthumously conceived child born to a
decedent’s surviving widow could be considered a nonmarital child. E.g., Woodward v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266-67 (Mass. 2002) (“Because death ends a
marriage . . . posthumously conceived children are always nonmarital children”).
Nevertheless, a provision in a will, trust, or other governing instrument that relates to the
inclusion or exclusion of a nonmarital child, or to the inclusion or exclusion of a
nonmarital child under specific circumstances, would not have been inserted with a child
of assisted reproduction in mind.  Consequently, such a provision ought to be treated as
inapplicable to a child of assisted reproduction, and the Restatement so provides. See 3
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8 cmt. m. Accord, UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-705(b) (2010).
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of the class,44 assuming that the child was born within a reasonable time
after the soldier’s death.45
C. Post-mortem Sperm Retrieval
A different case is presented, however, if the decedent did not de-
posit sperm before his death but his sperm was retrieved after his death.
Post-mortem sperm retrieval makes it possible for a widow or surviving
female partner, unilaterally and without any previous discussion with
her deceased husband or male partner, to have his sperm harvested so
that she could become pregnant with “his” child without his prior ap-
proval in order to gain unjustified control of class-gift rights for the child
from him and possibly from one or more of his relatives.  In such a case,
therefore, the burden of proof that the deceased husband or male part-
ner consented to be treated as the child’s father remains on his widow or
surviving female partner, even if at his death no divorce proceeding was
44 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.8 cmt. k.  There have been a
few litigated cases dealing with the status of children conceived posthumously by assisted
reproduction. See e.g., Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’g 231
F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d 257; In re Estate of Kolacy, 753
A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).  These cases involved Social Security survivor
benefits for the children as dependents of the deceased father, not whether the child was
presumptively a member of a class created in a donative document.  In Astrue v. Capato,
132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the entitlement of posthumously
conceived children to Social Security survivor benefits depends on state intestacy law.
None of the litigated cases so far has involved the case of a soldier killed in action.
They have all involved a husband who is diagnosed with cancer or some other disease
requiring chemotherapy.  Before undergoing chemotherapy, which could render him in-
fertile, he deposits sperm in a sperm bank for use by his wife or, should he succumb to
the illness, by his widow.  He does succumb to the illness, and after his death, his widow
becomes pregnant with his child.  Just as in the case of the soldier’s child, the Restate-
ment’s rule would presumptively treat the child as a child of the deceased husband for
class-gift purposes, assuming that the child was born within a reasonable time after the
husband’s death (as the children were in these three cases).
45 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 15.1 cmt. j, which provides,
In cases in which the distribution date is the deceased parent’s death, a child
[conceived] posthumously by assisted reproduction is treated as in being at the
decedent’s death for purposes of the class-closing rules, if the child was born or
in utero within a reasonable time after the decedent’s death . . . .  Determining
whether birth or [in utero] occurred within a reasonable time after the dece-
dent’s death requires a balancing of the interest in final settlement of trusts and
estates and allowing the surviving spouse or domestic partner time to grieve
before making a decision whether to go forward with an assisted-reproduction
procedure, and how soon after death an attempt was made to produce a preg-
nancy through assisted reproduction, whether successful or not.  In cases in
which the distribution date arises after the deceased parent’s death, a child [con-
ceived] posthumously by assisted reproduction is in being on the date when the
child is in utero for purposes of the class-closing rules, just as is any other child
. . . .
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pending or the partnership was not dissolved or in the process of being
dissolved.46  That burden would be satisfied if the deceased husband or
partner signed a writing or other record expressly consenting to be
treated as the child’s father in case of post-death retrieval.  In the ab-
sence of such a writing or other record, the widow or surviving partner
has the burden of proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the decedent consented to post-death retrieval with intent to be
treated as the child’s father.
D. Surrogate Birth Mother
In surrogacy situations, which can arise in all of the situations de-
picted in the above table, the birth mother of the child of assisted repro-
duction did not get pregnant to have her child.  She got pregnant to
carry the child to term for an intended parent or for intended parents.
The Restatement’s position is that, with limited exceptions, the child is
not a child of the surrogate.47  The child is presumptively treated for
class-gift purposes as a child of an intended parent, but only if the in-
tended parent functioned as a parent of the child within a reasonable
time after the child’s birth.48
In some states, surrogacy agreements are unenforceable or illegal.49
For class-gift purposes, however, the enforceability or legality of the sur-
rogacy agreement or arrangement is irrelevant.50  Performance of an il-
legal or unenforceable agreement still produces a child who is entitled to
be treated as someone’s child.  Because the Restatement only deals with
class gifts, the question cannot arise unless a child is actually born.  The
only question is who has a parent-child relationship with the child.  Dis-
regarding the enforceability or legality of the surrogacy agreement has
the added advantage of avoiding conflict of laws questions that might
otherwise arise because of the mobility of society.  For example, a child
might be born as a result of a surrogacy agreement that was valid under
the law applicable when the contract was entered into but the intended
46 Id. § 14.8 cmt. k(1).
47 The only situation in which the surrogate birth mother is the child’s mother for
class-gift purposes is when a court order designates her as the child’s mother or she is the
child’s genetic mother and no intended parent functioned as a parent of the child within a
reasonable time after the child’s birth. See id. § 14.9 cmt. j.
48 Id. § 14.9 cmt. e.  If there were two intended parents, the child is a child of both if
both functioned as parents of the child within a reasonable time after the child’s birth.  If
only one of the two did so, the child is a child of the parent-functioning parent but not of
the other intended parent.
49 For a state-by-state survey of the legality of surrogacy agreements, see CHARLES
P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE § 5.4 (2d ed. 2011).
50 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14.9 cmt. d.
Spring 2012] THE NEW RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 39
parents or parent moved and later died in a state in which surrogacy
contracts are illegal (or vice versa).  It would be unacceptable for the
law to hold that a child who grew up in the household of the intended
parents or parent is not a child of the intended parents or parent simply
because the surrogacy agreement was illegal.
The Restatement recognizes a limited set of circumstances in which
a parent-child relationship can be established between a surrogacy child
and a decedent whose sperm or eggs were used after the decedent’s
death to conceive a child under a surrogacy agreement entered into af-
ter the decedent’s death.51  The requirement is that the decedent must
have intended to be treated as the parent of the child.  Unless there is
clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent, a decedent is deemed
to have intended to be treated as the parent of a surrogacy child if the
decedent, before death, deposited the sperm or eggs that were used to
conceive the child, when the decedent deposited the sperm or eggs, the
decedent was married and no divorce proceeding was pending, and the
decedent’s spouse or surviving spouse functioned as a parent of the child
within a reasonable time after the child’s birth.52  Under the Restate-
ment, the same presumption is extended to partners in a domestic part-
nership, where the partners are not separated and the partnership has
not been terminated and is not in the process of being terminated.
E. Class Closing
In cases in which the distribution date is the deceased parent’s
death, a child produced posthumously by assisted reproduction is
treated as in being at the decedent’s death for purposes of the class-
closing rules, if the child was born or in utero within a reasonable time
after the decedent’s death.53  Determining whether birth or pregnancy
occurred within a reasonable time after the decedent’s death requires a
balancing of the interest in final settlement of trusts and estates and
allowing the surviving spouse or domestic partner time to grieve before
making a decision whether to go forward with an assisted-reproduction
procedure, and how soon after death an attempt was made to produce a
pregnancy through assisted reproduction, whether successful or not.54
51 See id. § 14.9 cmt. g.
52 See id. § 14.9 cmt. h.
53 See id. § 15.1 cmt. j, illus. 7, 8, & 9.
54 The Uniform Probate Code provides that a child who is conceived after the dece-
dent’s death is treated as in being at the decedent’s death if the child is in utero not later
than 36 months after the decedent’s death or born not later than 45 months after the
decedent’s death (see UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120(k), 2-121(h) (2010)), which seem
appropriate periods for a court to adopt as reasonable times.
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In cases in which the distribution date arises after the deceased par-
ent’s death, a child produced posthumously by assisted reproduction is
in being on the date when the child is in utero for purposes of the class-
closing rules, just as is any other child:
Illustration.55 Grantor created a revocable inter vivos trust
shortly before her death.  The trustee was directed to pay the
income to Grantor for life, then “to pay the income to the chil-
dren of my son S commencing upon each child’s twenty-first
birthday, and at the death of S’s last surviving child, to pay the
principal of the trust to X charity.”  When Grantor died, S had
an infant daughter with his wife W.  Shortly after being diag-
nosed with leukemia, S feared that he would be rendered infer-
tile by the disease or by the treatment for the disease, so he left
frozen sperm at a sperm bank.  S consented to be the parent of
the child within the meaning of § 14.8, Comment k.  After
Grantor’s death, S died, and S’s widow W decided to become
artificially inseminated with his frozen sperm so that she could
have a second child by him.  Upon reaching 21, S’s second
child is entitled to receive half of the income.
V. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The law of powers of appointment was not in great need of reform.
For the most part, the Restatement tracks the substance of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers,56 although the material
is organized differently.
A. Decanting Powers
A topic that is much-discussed in the literature is the estate-plan-
ning uses of so-called decanting powers.  A decanting power is nothing
more than a power of appointment.  The Property Restatement recog-
nizes the authority of the donee of a power of appointment to exercise
the power by creating another trust out of all or a portion of the prop-
erty or property interest subject to the power.57  The Restatement also
recognizes the authority of the donee to create one or more powers of
55 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §15.1 cmt. j, illus. 10.
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 11.1 - 24.4
(1986).
57 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 19.13 cmt. d (dealing with the
exercise of a general power); Id. § 19.14 cmts. e, f (dealing with the exercise of a
nongeneral power).
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appointment over the income or principal or both of the new trust.58
Under the Restatement, a decanting power only exists if the power is
expressly created in the trust document; the Restatement does not pro-
vide that such a power intrinsically exists in all trusts.
Different rules apply, however, depending on whether the donee’s
power is a general power or a nongeneral power and depending on
whether the donee holds the power in a fiduciary capacity.  The holder
of a power of appointment cannot exercise the power beyond its scope59
and a trustee’s or other fiduciary’s exercise of a power of appointment is
subject to fiduciary obligations.60
B. Creditors’ Rights
The common-law rule was that the donee’s creditors could not
reach appointive assets covered by an unexercised general power of ap-
pointment if the power was created by someone other than the donee.
The rationale was that until the donee exercised the power, the donee
had not accepted sufficient control over the appointive assets to give the
donee the equivalent of ownership of them.61
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts diverged from the common-law
rule in 2003.62  That Restatement represents the current position of the
American Law Institute, and is the rule adopted in the Property Re-
statement.63  The rule adopted by both Restatements is that property
subject to a presently exercisable general power of appointment that
was created by someone other than the donee is subject to claims of the
donee’s creditors to the same extent that it would be subject to those
claims if the property were owned by the donee, but only to the extent
that property owned by the donee or the donee’s estate is insufficient to
satisfy those claims.  The rationale is that a presently exercisable general
power is an ownership-equivalent power, whether the donee exercised
the power or not.
58 See id. § 19.13 cmt. f (dealing with the exercise of a general power); Id. § 19.14
cmts. g-g(5) (dealing with the exercise of a nongeneral power).
59 See id. § 19.13 cmt. g(2).
60 Id. § 17.1 cmt. g; See id. § 19.14 cmt. f; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 86
(2003); See also id. § 50 cmt. a.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2 cmt. a (1986)
(adhering to the common-law rule but recognizing that statutory law in a number of
states had departed from the common-law rule.)
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmts. b, c (2003).
63 See id. § 22.3.
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C. Spousal Elective-Share Rights
The Restatement Second provided that property subject to a gen-
eral power of appointment is treated as assets owned by the donee at
death for purposes of the elective-share rights of the donee’s surviving
spouse, but only if the appointive property was originally owned by the
donee and the donee transferred that property retaining a general
power over it.64  The new Property Restatement retains this restriction
for property subject to a general testamentary power, but lifts the re-
striction for property subject to a general power that was presently exer-
cisable immediately before the donee’s death.65  Because a presently
exercisable general power is an ownership-equivalent power, the Re-
statement adopts the rule that property subject to a general power that
was exercisable immediately before the donee’s death is treated as
owned at death even if the power was conferred on the donee by an-
other person.  This rule is based on an analogy to the elective-share
treatment of property that is owned by the decedent at death.  Property
owned at death is subject to the spouse’s elective-share rights, without
distinction between property that the decedent acquired by gift from
another person or by other means.
D. Miscellaneous Features
Other features of the Restatement’s treatment of powers of ap-
pointment are less central to the practice of estate planners, but could
become important in cases of botched practice.  The Restatement gives
more prominence to the gift-in-default clause in cases of ineffective ap-
pointments of general powers,66 reduces the consequence of exercising a
power by a blending clause,67 provides that a donee’s residuary clause
indicates an intent to exercise a general power, but only in the absence
of takers-in-default and in the absence of a specific-reference require-
ment,68 and adopts a substantial compliance doctrine with respect to do-
nor imposed formalities.69
VI. PERPETUITIES AND THE DEAD HAND
Perpetuity law is now statutory, so the Property Restatement’s po-
sition on perpetuities is aspirational.  Perpetuity law is no longer made
in judicial opinions.  If the Restatement is to be successful in shaping the
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.7 (1986).
65 See id. § 23.1.
66 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 19.21.
67 See id. §§ 19.19, 19.21.
68 See id. § 19.4.
69 See id. § 19.10.
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law, it will have to be through legislation, possibly by forming the basis
of a new uniform act on perpetuities.  Nothing in that direction will hap-
pen unless and until Congress places a durational limit on the GST ex-
emption (I.R.C. § 2631).70  Nevertheless, the American Law Institute
took the occasion to express its position that the recent perpetual-trust
movement is ill advised.71
The perpetual-trust movement has not been based on the merits of
removing any serious curb on excessive dead-hand control.  The policy
issues associated with allowing perpetual trusts have not been seriously
discussed in the state legislatures.  There is no evidence that it was un-
derstood that a perpetual trust can have as many as 450 living benefi-
ciaries 150 years after creation, more than 7000 living beneficiaries after
250 years, and over 114,000 living beneficiaries after 350 years.72  Nor
does it seem to have been understood that after 175 years, the settlor’s
genetic relationship to all of his or her then-living beneficiaries will drop
below one percent and, as the trust presses on into the more-distant
future, the settlor’s genetic relationship to the beneficiaries will decline
further, as the trust benefits ever-more remote relatives.73  The state leg-
islatures have been more influenced by an effort to retain trust business
within the enacting state and to compete for trust business from other
states.74
The driving force underlying the perpetual-trust movement is the
failure of Congress to impose a durational limit on the GST exemption.
The American Law Institute concluded: “An unintended consequence
70 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST Exemption for Perpet-
ual Trusts, 135 TAX NOTES 1267-72 (June 4, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2083804; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Should Effectively Curb the GST Exemption
for Perpetual Trusts, 136 TAX NOTES 1216-17 (Sept. 3, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2147989.
71 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introductory Note to ch. 27 (Rule
Against Perpetuities), at p. 564; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control:
The American Law Institute Declares the Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised 1-13
(Univ. Mich. Public Law, Working Paper No. 199, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1614934.
72 See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introductory Note to ch. 27 (Rule
Against Perpetuities), at pp. 554-56; Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The
Folly of Perpetual Trusts 1-16 (Univ. Mich. Public Law, Working Paper No. 259, 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975117.
73 See Waggoner, supra note 72, at 1-14.
74 See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 80-81 (2010) (noting that the ability to offer perpetual trusts “created a
marketing bonanza for banks and trust companies. . . .”); Max M. Schanzenbach & Rob-
ert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2465, 2466-68 (2006); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach,
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and
Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410 (2005).
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of tax law should not determine policy on so fundamental a matter as
state perpetuity law, especially since history suggests that tax loopholes
do not last indefinitely.”75
The American Law Institute not only deemed the perpetual-trust
movement ill advised.  It proposed a new approach to perpetuities.
With certain qualifications and exceptions,76 the new approach limits
the duration of trusts to two younger generations.77
A. Shift From Lives In Being to Generations
A previously unexamined assumption of the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities and the wait-and-see movement is that the
perpetuity period—the maximum limit—must be measured by lives in
being at the creation of the interest.  Requiring the lives to be in being
at the creation of the interest prevents the perpetuity period from ad-
justing to the trust and family circumstances, because that requirement
often divides members of the same generation into measuring and non-
measuring lives.  Although trusts commonly confer lifetime benefits on
members of one generation before passing benefits to the next genera-
tion, the life-in-being requirement means that only those members of a
generation who are in being at the creation of the interest can be used to
measure the perpetuity period.  Members of the same generation who
come into being later cannot be used.  The Restatement replaces the “in
being” requirement with a rule that measures the perpetuity period by
generations.  With certain qualifications and exceptions, the Rule—as
promulgated in the Restatement—limits dead-hand control to granting
benefits through but not beyond two generations younger than the
transferor.  The result is that the perpetuity period is tailored to the indi-
vidual trust and family circumstances.
B. Shift from Time of Vesting to Time of Termination
Historically, the Rule has focused on contingent future interests
and the time of vesting.  The Rule has been formulated to prevent a
contingent future interest from continuing to exist beyond the allowable
perpetuity period.  That mechanism has some merit but is not well al-
75 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introductory Note to ch. 27 (Rule
Against Perpetuities), at p. 568.
76 See id. § 27.1.  The Restatement has special rules for cases in which the share of a
beneficiary is distributable upon reaching a specified age of 30 or younger and for trusts
whose sole current beneficiary is a named great-grandchild.
77 See id.; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes a New
Approach to Perpetuities: Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger Generations (Univ.
Mich. Public Law, Working Paper No. 200, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1614936.
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igned with the purpose of the Rule, which is to limit dead-hand control.
The rule of the Restatement focuses on the time when the trust or other
disposition of property terminates.  The time of termination as opposed
to the time of vesting coordinates more purposively with the Rule’s ob-
jective of limiting dead-hand-control, because the time of termination is
when the property comes under the control of the ultimate beneficiaries.
Another benefit of shifting from the time of vesting to the time of termi-
nation is that the distinction between a contingent and a vested future
interest becomes irrelevant.
C. Judicial Modification
Judicial modification of an otherwise noncomplying trust or other
donative disposition of property is an integral part of the Rule Against
Perpetuities adopted in the Restatement.  A trust or other donative dis-
position of property that does not terminate on or before the expiration
of the perpetuity period is not invalid.  The property does not return to
and then through the estate of the long-deceased transferor.  Instead,
the trust or other donative disposition is subject to judicial modification.
In most cases, the form of modification will accelerate the right to pos-
session of the beneficiaries of the trust or other disposition.
VII. CONCLUSION
The new Property Restatement, in association with the new Trusts
Restatement, has now systematically proceeded through the whole field
of wills, will substitutes, trusts, and estates.  Both of the new Restate-
ments should prove to be handy resources for trust and estate lawyers,
not only in preparing to argue cases at both trial and appellate levels,
but also in the everyday work of drafting and construing dispositive pro-
visions in wills, trusts, and other types of donative documents.  Each
Restatement section is followed by a set of Comments explaining and
illustrating the black letter and by Reporter’s Notes collecting relevant
cases, statutes, and secondary sources.
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